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Our inquiry is not after that which is perfect, well
knowing that no such thing is found among men;
but we seek that human Constitution which is
attended with the least, or the most, pardonable
inconvenience.
(Algernon Sidney, quoted on the title page of
F. A. Hayek's The Constitution of Liberty)
Sia la Constitucion de/a Libertad (main government
slogan during the campaign for the new Chilean
Constitution, September 1980)
Introduction
Chile is of fairly limited strategic importance both in
terms of its geopolitical position and its natural resources.
Nevertheless, it has aroused world-wide interest for
the various political-economic-social experiments it
has undergone in the last 15 years: from the Christian
Democratics' 'Revolution in Liberty' to the essentially
Euro-Communist 'Democratic Transition to Socialism'
and to the Chicago social market economy within
'The Constitution of Liberty'. Each experiment was
seen by its proponents as the long-run solution to
Chilean political and economic problems, and each
experiment involved learned debates on its supposed
'irreversibility'.
The present Chilean model, ideologically inspired by
the so-called Chicago School, and to a great extent
financed by private banks, arouses as deep a controversy
as the previous two models. This controversy has
received a wider airing with the electoral victory of
Margaret Thatcher in Britain and Ronald Reagan in
the USA. For all three governments invoke a rhetoric
which, allowing for national differences, reveal a
common economic foundation: the antistatism, pro
free market 'monetarist' prescriptions associated with
the Chicago School of Milton Friedman and Friedrich
von Hayek'.
The then British Minister of Trade Cecil Parkinson, acknowledged
the validity of the comparison between Britain and Chile, when he
pointed out that Britain is trying, as Chile has done, to reduce tariffs,
public expenditure, state bureaucracy and taxes on profits; to reduce
controls and restrictions on prices, salaries, exchange rates and
investment; to break state monopolies; and, in brief, to re-establish
the role of the private sector and reduce that of the public. 'The
Chilean economic experience', he concluded, 'is very similar to what
we are developing here', though 'in the case of Chile it was possible to
impose a policy and regulate its implementation, but this isn't possible
in our country. Here we have to proceed with more caution and
convince people of the benefits of our policies' El Mercurio, Edición
Internacional, 5 November 1980).
It could be argued that Reagan's economic programme with its
emphasis on the 'supply side' the Laffer curve et al has nothing to do
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It is this seemingly paradoxical combination of economic
market individualism and freedom with a political
authoritarian inclined state which characterises the
dominant trend of the new right-wing forces in Western
capitalism. The particular mix of that combination
depends on national circumstances with the political
authoritarianism of the 'new democracy' in Chile, for
example, reaching extremes. The emergence of this
bloc in developed capitalist societies marks the defeat
(perhaps temporary) of Keynesian social consensus
politics and economics.
The article is concerned with analysing the Chicago
strategy and how it becahie the dominant strategy in
Chile after the coup of 11 September 1973. The first
part looks at the relationship between the Chicago-
trained economists and the making of the coup. The
second analyses some of the key policy decisions
within the main stages of the Chilean process. The
third part attempts to analyse the model as a totality,
with a look at some of its main contradictions.
The Chicago School and the Chicago Boys
One of the peculiarities of Chile is that thanks to an
agreement signed between the University of Chicago
and the Catholic University of Chile in 1955, a large
number of Chilean economists, 'the brightest and the
best', had studied postgraduate economics at the
University of Chicago. Between 1955 and 1963 this
exchange was financed by the USA Government Aid
Agency (the USA Institute of International Assistance
originally justified financing this link on the ground
that it was important to combat the spread of ECLA
ideas), and thereafter Chilean businessmen and others
financed the scheme. Not every Chilean of course
who studied in Chicago became an adherent of the
extremist Chicago philosophy, but it is amazing how
many of the Chilean Chicago Boys did (the name
commonly given in Chile to the Chicago trained
economists). They became determined not only to
gain control of the Economics Department of the
Catholic University, but to find a wider audience for
their views. In the words of one of them, 'we set out to
win elite opinion to our positions; and to do this we
concentrated on the quality media' (interview with E.
Sanfuentes, May 28 1980). Even before Allende's
victory, Chicago Boys obtained important footholds
in the media, writing, for example in the Economic
with Chicago orthodoxy. Much of the 'supply side' economics,
however, is pure public relations (outside of defence, which is
compatible with Chicago) and the programme is essentially that of
Chicago.
Page of El Mercurio. And with the establishment of
the influential weekly Que Pasa (owned by a Chicago
Boy) the Chicago philosophy spread rapidly. In 1968 a
group of Chicago Boys established aright-wing think
tank, CESEC2 and through it attempted to push the
programme of the right-wing Presidential candidate,
Jorge Alessandri, in the direction of the Chicago
model. CESEC was asked to draw up Alessandri's
economic programme; but the Chicago model was
opposed by many of Alessandri's business supporters
and had to be put into cold storage 'as it was a
programme difficult to implement within a democracy',
as one leading businessman, M. Valdes, ex-President
of the Confederation of Production and Commerce,
put it (interview 17 June 1980). Nevertheless the campaign
was useful in winning important adherents to the
Chicago plan among key businessmen.
The philosophy behind the Chicago plan is a very
simple one; a dogmatic insistence on the allocational
efficiency of the market through the private ownership
of the means of production. It is a simple but all
pervasive doctrine and one which combines the two
main and different components within the Chicago
School: the neo-Austrian subjectivists under Hayek,
and the positivist monetarists under Friedman.
In spite of important differences within the Chicago
School, all believe in the need to maintain the process
of competition (it is not a perfect competition general
equilibrium model, but rather an unending and changing
tendency towards an equilibrium modelan auto-
matically adjusting catalaxy in Hayek's phrase) against
that which threatens it. What threatens this process of
competition is a certain sort of state interference and
the activities of monopolies, particularly trade unions
(employer monopolies are not considered very important,
and on the whole it is argued that state interference to
break up these monopolies has been more harmful
than beneficial). It should be emphasized that this is
not a laissez-faire position: indeed both Hayek and
Friedman advocate the need for a strong state which
actively ensures the workings of competition, eg in the
field of industrial relations. What is important is that
the state acts within a proper set of principles designed
to ensure that the rules of the game are universal and
impersonal.
The Chicago model then, is essentially an exchange or
circulationary model in which individual or household
knowledge of prices and costs to achieve efficiency
can only be acquired by the operation of market
processes themselves. As it is an exchange model,
social classes, of course, make no appearance. The
2The establishment of free-market think-tanks has been important. In
Chile these included CESEC, and under Allende, the Instituto de
Estudios Generales, and in 1980 a Centre for Policy Studies was
established with Friedrick von Hayek as Honorary President.
emphasis is on individual liberty which, in turn, is
defined in terms of the market place. The Chicago
School consider the market to be non-coercive by
definition, and liberty is defined as 'that condition of
men in which coercion of some by others is reduced as
much as possible in society'.
Democracy may help economic liberty, but it is not a
necessary condition for it. It is, therefore, possible for
economic liberty to exist within an authoritarian regime.3
Indeed, democracy, it is argued, can endanger liberty
by giving to the state all sorts of powers which threaten
the exercise of individual liberty, and must, therefore,
be controlled and limited through severely restricting
state activities and confining these to strengthening
the market and the rule of law and weakening
organisations such as political parties and trade
unions.4
As a model for Chile and other underdeveloped
countries, this basic paradigm added a number of
other emphases, the most important being the doctrine
of comparative advantage and an assertion that Third
World countries do best by integrating themselves
into the international capitalist economy.5 'Inward-
looking industrialisation' was considered a failure, for
'such industrialisation was highly inefficient and prone
to be self-limiting, if not self-defeating, and what was
required was access to larger, foreign markets' [Johnson
1971 I. Coupled with this was the view of the multinational
corporation as the development agency, and hence
the demand for an open policy towards them. The
new model also emphasized the need to develop a
capital market.5 In addition, they offered a monetarist
explanation of inflation.7
3Hayek has argued that it is possible that democracy can acquire
totalitarian powers' and that 'an authoritarian government can act
according to liberal principles'. There is now a host of right-wing
authors emphasizing the dangers of democracy to the functioning of 1
capitalist economy.
4Clearly, what the model does not want to recognise is that historically,
as Macpherson has pointed out Macpherson 19731. there has been a
tendency that the pure market leads to political power being used not
to offset, but to reinforce economic power. Hence, contrary to the
Chicago position, the growth of political parties, trade unions, the
welfare state, and much state intervention, had been experienced by
millions of people as a way of checking economic power by political
power, and not as an intrusion into their liberty.
The ex- President of the Chilean Central Bank, A Bardon's commonly
quoted phrase. 'If comparative advantage determines that Chile
should produce nothing but melons, then we will produce nothing but
melons', sums ups this attitude.
'This was given a particularly strong emphasis in Chile. In this field
and others R. I. McKinnon has played an important advisory role:
and the Chilean model could perhaps best be interpreted as a mixture
of his ideas together with the Chicago School, plus some crudities
from Chilean military national security doctrines.
ln the Chicago 'underdevelopment' model, any historical or structural
explanations of underdevelopment are discarded and the emphasis
placed on the market allocation of resources, and the necessity of
removing obstacles to the efficient operation of international and
national markets, In one Gordian stroke, the bulk of post-war
development theorising is thus cut out of consideration.
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The Chicago Boys and the Making of
the Coup
The Popular Unity experience provided the Chicago
Boys with perhaps a unique opportunity to influence
the course of events for the implementation of their
model. But it should be made clear, of course, that
neither they nor any other group caused the coup.
They took advantage of the deep-seated crisis which
emerged at every level of society during the Allende
period. And the Allende crisis was in turn the outcome
ola long process of political and economic difficulties
associated with nearly all semi-industrialised countries
undertaking an import substitution industrialisation
strategy. The economic difficulties were exacerbated
during the Allende Government; as a result by 1973
inflation reached very high levels (around 600 per
cent) and foreign exchange reserves were exhausted
In Chile this crisis took a particularly acute form
under Allende, requiring a more dramatic response
after the coup. It was this experience which perhaps
explains the degree of 'relative autonomy' of the state
apparatus after the coup, allowing a relatively small
group of people to push through a series of drastic
reforms which, in the short run, went against the
immediate interests of so many sectors of Chilean
capital.
How, then, did the Chicago Boys organise themselves
during the Allende period so that they would be in a
position to seize the initiative after the coup, and
become the 'vanguard party' of a section of the Chilean
bourgeoisie? A partial answer lies in the role they
played in the making of the coup. In the feverish
atmosphere of Allende's Chile, there was no shortage
of groups plotting and planning Allende's downfall.
There were two key problems: how to coordinate
these groups into a mass opposition movement and
how to push the armed forces into making a coup. No
groupperse was the pawn of another group: only after
the coup was it clear who was using whom, and this
only through a post hoc ergo propter hoc deduction.
Nevertheless, an examination of those key groups
organising for the coup reveals an important role for a
group of Chicago Boys.
The initial opposition to Popular Unity (apart from
the early CIA-inspired disruptive tactics like the
murder of General Schneider) was organised through
the main opposition political parties, the Christian
Democrat Party and the National Party. But when the
struggle passed beyond the confines of the Congress
and the Senate, the political parties of the right played
an increasingly subordinate role to the gremialismo
movement (representing the corporate interests of
employers and professionals, and later, women and
youth and sectors of the labour movement). The role
of right-wing political parties was to stall Popular
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Unity legislation, support the mass movement of
opposition, and legitimise the coup by declaring Allende
and Popular Unity illegal. The non-democratic wing
of the National Party willingly accepted this, and
indeed, had been preparing for such moves by winning
leadership positions within the gremios; but the
democratic wing of the National Party and the Christian
Democrats found that the effective leadership of
opposition to Popular Unity had slipped out of their
hands.
There was undoubtedly an element of spontaneity in
the gremialismo movement, but it still needed co-
ordination and finance. Responsibility for this was
taken by a shadowy group of businessmen known as
the Monday Club, so-called because its members met
almost every Monday to coordinate activities. The
key members of this group included several Chicago
economics graduates; amongst them, Manuel Cruzat,
who was later to emerge ts the head of one of the two
largest economic groups in Chile. In the words of one
member of this group, 'We met roughly on a weekly
basis from the middle of 1971 onwards to plan the
media campaign, organise and coordinate actions,
particularly of the gremios, and to distribute money,
much of which came from abroad', (interview with O
Saenz, 16 June 1980). Members of this group also had
contact with the terrorist neo-fascist organisation,
Pat ria y Libertad, whose leader, Pablo Rodriguez, was
to complain after the coup that promises made to him
on economic matters had been broken.
Preparations for a coup began in the Navy. Their main
go-between to members of the Monday Club was an
ex-navy officer Roberto Kelly, who after the coup was
to become head of the National Planning Office,
ODEPLAN, and later Minister of the Economy. One
of the worries of the navy officers was, of course, what
to do about the economy after the coup. Kelly
volunteered to arrange for a detailed plan to be drawn
up. A group of Chicago-trained economists had been
meeting periodically and informally to discuss the
economic situation throughout the Allende period.
But after March 1973, at the request of the navy
officers and certain business interests, a group of
Chicago Boys met to draw up an economic plan to be
implemented after the fall of Allende.
Ten leading economists drew up this plan. They were
A. Bardon, A. Sanfuentes, J. L. Zabala and Juan
Villarzu, virtually the Departamento Técnico of the
Christian Democrat Party, P. Baraona, and S. Undurraga
of the National Party, and Sergio de Castro, Manuel
Cruzat, Juan Braun and Emilio Sanfuentes, closely
linked to entrepreneurial and gremial groups.8 The
'All but two were trained in Chicago. These two, J. Braun and S.
Undurraga, are considered by the Chicago Boys as Honorary Chicago
Boys. as also are J. Cauas, ex-Minister of Finance, and J. Piñera,,
Minister of Mines.
plan was systematically leaked to certain naval officers
who, in turn, leaked it to certain airforce officers (the
army seems to have had a minor role in those days). By
the time of the coup a 280-odd page plan had been
written, and was in the hands of the Junta. Not
surprisingly, virtually the day after the coup many of
the authors of the plan entered the key Economic
Ministries as 'advisers'.
The above account is not intended to support any
conspiratorial theory of history (for it does not explain
why one 'conspiracy' wins or loses), but rather to
emphasize the importance of class organisational
capacities and the role of particular networks in providing
them, and to show that the Chicago Boys fed into a
highly effective organisation linked directly to leading
business interests. (It is indicative that, in moments of
crisis, it is leading businessmen who become long and
short-term political planners rather than traditional
politicians.)
This brief history helps explain how the Chicago Boys
came to dominate certain key sectors of the state after
the coup. One of their notable characteristics is their
attempt to combine theory and practice, and to take
advantage of crises when they come to restructure the
economy and society according to their philosophy
(for these characteristics they have been rightly called
'the Marxists of the Right'). In Chile, some Chicago-
trained economists became leading entrepreneurs, eg
Manuel Cruzat and Rolf Lüders; others became leading
members of the economic groups after a period in
government, eg Pablo Baraona. All closely identify
themselves with business interests. Many connect
themselves to right-wing think-tanks. They have a
strong sense of social cohesion ('we are the brightest
and the best'), of dedication to their tasks, and of
team-work (in the words of one of them, 'we have an
unwritten pact among ourselves not to resign in protest
or sympathy if one of us gets sacked, but to carry on to
win our aims') They thus act as a 'vanguard party',
and are indeed highly effective 'organic intellectuals.'
The Initial Phase: the Period of Transition,
September 1973 April 1975
The original economic plan was a product of independent
economists, nearly all trained in Chicago. Nevertheless,
the plan was also a politically 'negotiated' document.
Leaders of the National Party and the Christian Democrat
Party knew that members of their party were involved
in designing a plan, and to that extent gave their
blessing, but neither party gave its official consent to
participate in designing the plan, or approved it
afterwards. The plan was also 'negotiated' in another
sense in that it was clearly a compromise between the
'soft' Christian Democrat Chicago Boys, and the other
hard-liners. As such, and given the role of the Christian
Democrat economists in the government after the
coup, it was initially difficult for the Christian Democrat
Party to oppose the general direction of economic
change.
Politically, the initial situation was very confused. The
original structure of government decision-making was
that of a Junta witha genuine degree of decentralised
decision-making to each member of the Junta. The
early stages involved much political in-fighting, but
over a period of time, General Pinochet did away with
the dispersal of power within the Junta, centralising all
decision-making within his own hands. This centralisation
of power was supported both by the hard-line Chicago
Boys, who realised that politically the implementation
of their programme required the centralisation of
power, and by the neo-fascist groups within the
government, who wanted 'the leader' to implement
their corporatist project, and the army whose weight
within the armed forces made them resentful of equal
treatment for all branches of the armed forces. At the
same time, the Christian Democrat Party slowly moved
into opposition, and the Christian Democrat economists
either resigned from the government (eg J. Villarzu,
A. Sanfuentes and J. L. Zabala) or resigned from the
Christian Democrat Party and moved into the hard-
line Chicago position (eg A. Bardon and J. Cauas).
Thus the Chicago plan needed General Pinochet:
even a modified degree of internal democratic decision-
making was incompatible with its implementation.
Even so, during the initial confused period, the Chicago
Boys were able to make decisions of strategic importance
for the implementation of the Chicago plan. Two
early decisions, for example, were to implement a
drastic programme of tariff reductions, in effect opening
up the Chilean economy to the international economy,
and to free prices. The decision that the structure of
relative prices was more important than the absolute
level of prices, and that the structure has to be that of
the international economy, was of key political
importance, and a typical Chicago tactic. As Emilio
Sanfuentes was to argue afterwards, the freeing of
prices was so inflationary that it led everyone later to
be in favour of drastically reducing State expenditure
and tariffs, two of the main objectives of the Chicago
plan.
There were other decisions of key importance in this
period. State enterprises, particularly the big loss
makers, such as textiles, were privatised as quickly as
possible. The first steps towards establishing a capital
market were rushed through, and prepared the way
for the spectacular growth of the economic groups.
The exchange rate was drastically devalued and unified.
A new foreign investment code was passed to attract
foreign investment (this was later modified as having
too many restrictions on foreign investment). Relations
were normalised with the main international financial
institutions such as the IMF, the World Bank and
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private foreign banks. Both the IMF and the World
Bank rushed in teams shortly after the coup to give
their blessing to the general direction proposed by the
Chicago plan. But their role was not to impose on a
reluctant Chilean Government, but to support the
Chicago Boys against any opposition. All these measures
moved Chile in the general direction designed in the
economic plan.
However, the pace of change was regarded by the
hard-line Chicago economists as insufficient for the
complete restructuring of the Chilean economy. Chile
was still too statist, too paternalistic in social welfare,
and too protectionist. So even before the conjunctui-al
crisis of 1975, some of the Chicago group began to
argue the need for 'shock treatment', ostensibly to end
the inflationary spiral but also to restructure the
economy, and to attack those advocating a 'gradualist'
approach.
The Second Phase: Shock and the Period of
Restructuring, April 1975 December 1976
The build-up to shock had, in fact, began in 1974 when
E/Mercurio published a series of articles attacking the
delay in dismantling the state sector. In May 1974, this
theme was taken up by Admiral Merino when he
declared that public expenditure and not unemployment
was the main enemy. In July 1974, A. Harberger put
his weight behind this, arguing that you cannot have
monetary stability without unemployment. Those
favouring 'shock treatment' would probably have had
difficulty in achieving the radical restructuring they
wanted if the conjunctural crisis of 1975 had not
forced the need for drastic decisions.
The conjunctural crisis began with the fall in the price
of copper combined with the increase in the price of
oil, and led the Minister of Finance to declare that
Chile faced a $1,000mn loss for 1975 from these two
factors, and that drastic action was required. This
drastic action was put in stark terms: without
unemployment, bankruptcies, and a drastic reduction
in state expenditure, stabilisation would not work.
Another theme was also emphasized: if drastic treatment
was applied rapidly and logically an economic miracle
would follow after an apparent two or three year
economic period of hardships.
This line was supported by both Harberger and Friedman
when they visited Chile in March 1975. Both emphasized
that the policy of applying palliatives instead of
amputating the diseased parts ran the danger that the
final cost would be higher. Chile faced the choice of a
short period of high temporary unemployment or a
long period of high unemployment. Friedman reiterated
the 'the immediate cause of inflation is always a
consequence of a larger increase in the amount of
money than production and this is clearly so in the
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Chilean case. The first necessity therefore is to end
inflation, and the only way Chile can do this is by
drastically cutting the fiscal deficit, preferably by
reducing public expenditure. . . in Chile . . . gradualism
seems to me impossible' (El Mercurio, April 1975). At
the same time, an IMF mission visited Chile, and
agreed a stand-by credit with the government, which
committed it to strongly deflationary policies.
After another piece of political infighting, the hard-
line Chicago Boys in effect secured an economic
dictatorship. With the change of Cabinet in April
1975, Jorge Cauas was appointed Super-Minister in
charge of most of the key ministries. He met on an
almost daily basis with the newly appointed Minister
of Economy, Sergio de Castro, the newly appointed
President of the Banco Central, Pablo Baraona, and
the head of ODEPLAN, Roberto Kelly. This four-man
team directed the course of shock treatment. On the
political side there had l?een a suspension of virtually
all forms of 'legislativ& body and Pinochet was the
sole political arbitrator, aided and abetted by the
Chilean secret police, or 'DINA', whose influence
grew by leaps and bounds. Paradoxically, therefore,
the Chicago shock plan required the dramatic increase
in the power of the DINA, although later the Chicago
Boys were to turn against it.
The results of shock were dramatic. From the end of
1974 to the end of 1976 unemployment increased from
9.7 per cent to 18.7 per cent. GNP fell by 12.8 per cent
in 1975, perhaps the most dramatic fall in output seen
outside of exceptional events like war or natural
disasters; industrial production fell by approximately
27 per cent in one year! The Consumer Price Index
fell from 376 in 1974 to 340.7 in 1975, and to 174.3 in
1976.
The loss in the terms of trade from the fall in the
copper price and the increase in the oil price has been
calculated by Foxley 119791 to be equivalent to 5.6 per
cent of GNP. Yet GNP fell by much more, ie the
recession engineered by shock went far beyond anything
required to maintain Chile in its original position. In
other words, the purpose of shock treatment went
much further than to confront the particular conjunctural
crisis. Rather, the Chicago Boys used shock tactics to
put through the particular restructuring which they
thought necessary for their long-run objectives.
One can see this from a whole series of policies
pursued throughout 'shock'. The average tariff was
reduced from 52 per cent at the beginning of 1975 to
33 per cent at the end of 1976, with the highest tariff
rate being reduced from 120 per cent to 60 per cent.
The process of privatisation continued, even of those
enterprises which were not making a loss, and even
though the state sold them in a period of recession and
therefore at a very reduced price. Also the drive to
establish a capital market continued, and various
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measures were taken to try and move funds into the
new financial institutions. The drastic devaluations,
together with the dramatic collapse of internal demand,
in effect reduced imports (no attempt was made to
control the type of imports) and expanded exports to
such an extent that Chile initially moved from a deficit
to a surplus on its 1976 balance of trade.
By the time these policies eased, at the end of 1976,
the Chilean economy had been restructured. Exports
became the more dynamic sector. Industry faced
fierce competition from foreign manufacturers and,
with the collapse of its internal market, was clearly in a
difficult position. The state's economic and social
activities had been drastically curtailed. The working
class was weakened through repression and the creation
of a massive 'industrial reserve army'. Finally, the
Chilean economy was effectively integrated into the
international capitilist economy: the Chilean withdrawal
from the Andean Pact in 1976 was a formal recognition
of this.
The key question remainedwould the economic
miracle follow, as the Chicago Boys had promised?
The Third Phase: the Period of
Consolidation, 1977-80
The third phase, which begins with the replacement of
Jorge Cauas by Sergio de Castro in the Ministry of
Finance and ends with the 'yes' vote in the plebiscite
for the new Constitution, is marked by the consolidation
of economic policies and the beginnings of a new
political institutionality.
Many key economic policy decisions were taken during
this phase. Tariff reforms were speeded up so that by
the end of 1978 Chile's average tariff was about 10 per
cent, making Chile one of the most open economies in
the world.
Virtually all restrictions on the contraction of debt
abroad were removed which, given the situation of
liquidity in the international monetary market, meant
Chile had around $3mn a day entering into it. The
foreign investment code was reformed towards an
open policy of removing all restrictions on foreign
investment in an effort to maximise the entry of
foreign investment. The process of privatisation was
continued, and where this met resistance from sectors
of the armed forces and trade unions, privatisation of
as many as possible of the ancillary services around a
state enterprise was carried out. The financial market
reforms were deepened, leading to a massive upsurge
in stock market and other operations, and a growth
and consolidation of the power of a few large financial
conglomerates. Both the fiscal budget and those of the
semi-autonomous state enterprises were successfully
balanced. And, finally, and most controversially, the
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peso was revalued, followed by a period of crawling
devaluation, until finally in 1979 the exchange rate
was fixed at 39 pesos to the dollar in an effort to
stabilise Chile's rate of inflation at the international
rate.
Politically this period saw the open outbreak of major
differences within the government. The 'new democracy'
was meant to culminate in the plebiscite of 11 September
1980, in which more than 60 per cent of the population
voted 'yes' to the Constitution of Liberty. However,
the Constitution did no more than ratify the con-
centration and personalisation of power in the hands
of one person, General Pinochet, in that the full
operation of the Constitution was postponed for a
transitional period of eight years.
Aware of the danger and fragility of having a political
system depend so much on one man, the Chicago
Boys are attempting an institutionalisation of their
model through sectoral 'modernisations'. So far this
has involved such major transformations as the new
Plan Laboral,' which has instituted an industrial relations
system in accordance with their market criteria; the
reform of the social security system, which in effect
will privatise the massive pensions funds putting them
into the capital market; the reform of public admin-
istration, local and regional government; and the
extension of the process of privatisation to health and
educational services, and other sectors. The key idea
here is to demolish finally the heritage of the import
substitution industrialisation era. Ideologically the
reforms are presented as decentralisation, but in practice
it means turning these state activities over to the
market and control by the major economic groups.
Whether such activities will be provided in the future
will depend on whether they are profitable, and whether
they are profitable will depend on a person's ability to
pay. Education, health, housing and welfare will thus
no longer be a right but a privilege for the few.
Thus, if one looks at the speed and extent of reforms
in Chile, there can be little doubt that Chile is undergoing
a 'successful' counter-revolution both economically
and institutionally. It has, in effect, become an example
of the authoritarian version of the Chicago model. We
now turn to see what are the main contradictions of
this imposed model.
The Model and its Contradictions
The model is essentially a very simple one, which
perhaps helps explain its attraction for sections of the
Chilean capitalist class after a period of intense struggle
and political conflict. It is an attempt to introduce
market forces into as many areas of economic and
social life as possible. This attempt takes place within
a logically consistent view of the role of the nation
state, and in turn its position within an international
economy.
It is important to emphasisethe difficulties in trying to
establish what has actually happened in Chile. Those
in favour of the model tend only to emphasise the
recent high growth rates, the decline in inflation, the
growth of non-traditional exports, the large foreign
exchange reserves, the reduction of state expenditures
and a balanced fiscal budgetall within the framework
of political stability and law and order; whereas those
against the model point to the high rates of un-
employment, the worsening distribution of wealth,
income and power, the rise of the foreign debt, the low
level of accumulation, the suppression of democracy
and the use of terror, force and censorship against
opposition - in short, an economic dictatorship sup-
ported by bayonets.
On many issues, eg real wages, there are two sets of
statistics: those of the government and those of the
opposition. There are genuine difficulties in compiling
aggregate indices within an economy undergoing
profound and rapid structural changes, together with
very large and irregular price movements, but these
difficulties are compounded by a tendency to manipulate
the figures, particularly by those favouring the model.
This article uses these official statistics, supplemented
on certain issues by alternative statistics. The statistics
should, therefore, be treated as no more than tentative
guidelines.
a) The international economy
The Chicago position is that the market framework
must be that of the international economy; if not, it
will lead to pressure for state interference. The key
decision in Chile then, was to integrate Chile as fully
as possible to the international economy, and let that
market 'impersonally' impose a restructuring on Chilean
economy and society.
Within this move to integration, the key was that of
drastically reducing tariffs (at the time few Chilean
capitalists, apart from Vial and Cruzat, believed this
was possible.9 In his first speech after the coup, the
then Minister of Finance, Admiral Gotuzzo, announced
a programme of tariff reductions. Consequently, first
Jorge Cauas and then Sergio de Castro speeded up this
programme, so that within the short space of six years,
Chile moved from being a highly protected economy
to one of the most open economies in the world. In
December 1973 Chile had 5,125 specific tariff duties
of which 42 (0.8 per cent) were less than 10 per cent
and 1808 (37 per cent) more than a 100 per cent, with
an average median tariff of about 94 per cent. The
Sergio de Castro has been particularly strong on this point in the
discussions on the plan for Chile post-Allende, when tariff levels were
discussed, he proposed a zero tariff to ensure that the average tariff
level proposed would be as low as possible. (Interviews with various
members of the original team.)
trajectory of the median tariff was as follows: June
1974=67 per cent; August 1975=44 per cent; June
1976=33 per cent; December 1976=27 per cent;
December 1977=15.7 per cent; December 1978=11.9
per cent and December 1979=10.2 per cent.
This quickly revolutionised the extent and structure
of Chilean foreign trade. Total value of foreign trade
increased from $2.8bn in 1973 to $10.53bn in 1980;
exports increased from $1.3 lbn in 1973 to $4.86bn in
1980 and imports from $l.45bn to $5.69bn. A rapid
increase in 'non-traditional' exports can be seen, moving
Chile away from its traditionally excessive dependence
on copper exports. In constant 1975 USS non copper
exports increased from $344mn in 1973 to $906mn in
1978, of which the most important were paper and
wood products, fishmeal and frozen shell-fish, fresh
fruit and some metals essentially associated with copper,
eg molybdenum. By 1980 therefore, copper represented
only 43 per cent of exports compared to about 73 per
cent in 1973. On the import side one can see a
dramatic decline in the import of foodstuffs from 35
per cent in 1973 to 12 per cent in 1980; there was also
an increase in the import of consumer durables (from
9.6 per cent to 17.2 per cent) and of intermediate
goods (this includes fuels and lubricants) from 38 per
cent to 49 per cent, with capital goods increasing
slightly from 16.8 per cent to 20 per cent. The growth
in exports clearly reflects natural comparative
advantages, and involves very low value added, whilst
much of the increase in imports is in 'luxury' consumer
durables.
Part of the hope of integrating Chile into the international
economy was that Chile would attract large sums of
direct foreign private investment, and that the
multinational corporations would act as one of the
main 'development agents'. This has not happened. In
spite of one of the most pro foreign investment codes
in the world, Chile has failed to attract much direct,
foreign investment. Since 5 August 1974 (the date of
the original D.L. 600, later modified by Sergio de
Castro into an even more favourable code for foreign
investors) some 453 investment projects have been
approved worth about $429mn, and out of this only
some $751mn has actually entered the country. Of the
authorised projects $3,740.2mn is in mining, of which
only $298.3mn has entered. The overwhelming majority
of investments approved therefore, is in mining, but as
this is a long gestation in mining projects, much of the
approved investment may still take place. In some
cases it seems that the offer of large investments, by,
eg Rockefeller, was in part motivated by political
reasons. O
°The support given by ADELA (the Atlantic Community Development
Group of Latin America) seems to have been strongly motivated by
political factors. ADELA offered support at a critical moment of
Chile's international isolation to strengthen the hands of the Chicago
Boys and their supporters. (Information from interview with M.
Valdes, 17 June 1980.)
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The main way that Chile has integrated herself into
the international capitalist market has been through a
mechanism the Chicago Boys could not have foreseen
in 1973, namely, the contracting of private foreign
debt. With the massive growth in international liquidity,
Chile has contracted a large level of loans on the
private capital markets. As of December 1978 Chile
became top of the debt league, having the highest per
capita debt in the world at $644 per inhabitant and, in
absolute terms, eighth highest in the world. Since 1977
when foreign finance capital began to pour into Chile,
$6,460mn has entered, of which $4,338mn (75 per
cent) is private debt, almost entirely foreign banks
lending to Chilean banks. And even out of the traditional
foreign debt (ie the public sector's debt together with
the private sector's debt guaranteed by the government)
nearly 50 per cent (S2,367mn) of the $4,893mn in 1979
came from private banks and financial institutions.
In terms of 1976 dollars, the traditional debt fell from
$3,918mn in 1973 to $2,541mn in 1979, a fall of 35.1 per
cent, whereas the private sector debt increased from
$889mn in 1973 to $1,7Olmn in 1979, an increase of
91.3 per cent in real terms.
In 1978 Chile's debt service ratio was about 45.3 per
cent, placing Chile third in the world league (after
Brazil and Mexico) and over the last two years it has
risen even higher. Clearly, a potential contradiction in
the model must lie here. The Chicago Boys regard the
debt as a sign of confidence in the model and see no
need to restrain it; as long as money can be borrowed
and repaid why worry? But as argued later, much of
the debt has gone to finance consumption and buying
up existing assets, and only a relatively small part of it
to finance new productive investment. The consequences
of this are now beginning to be felt. These problems
have been worsened by the increase in interest rates in
the USA which has increased Chile's service charges
on its debt. Foreign bankers are beginning to become
more wary, particularly following the multi-million
dollar crash of Chile's sugar firm, CRAY. The dance
of the millions could still come crashing down.
The massive inflow of private foreign loans is also
partly responsible for Chile's return to a form of the
Gold Standard. After a period of massive devaluations,
a short revaluation of the peso in 1976, followed by a
period of crawling devaluations, the exchange rate
was finally fixed in 1979 at 39 pesos to the dollar, and
has since remained at that level. This policy, hardly
orthodox Chicago, which believes in floating exchange
rates, is designed to stabilise Chile's integration into
the international economy. A fixed exchange rate
together with a balanced budget is meant to ensure
that Chile's rate of inflation is pegged to the international
one. In addition, it is another way of subsidising the
large economic groups. As the top five economic
groups in Chile have contracted the overwhelming
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bulk of the private foreign debt, the fixed exchange
rate is a way of subsidising their debt.
Thus with a fixed exchange rate, balanced budget,
'free' interest rate, and large foreign capital inflows
and hence large foreign exchange reserves, the Chilean
economy is left to adjust itself automatically to the
international economy. Levels of production in Chile
are to be determined by the international economy
and not by national policies. Such is the logic of the
Chicago School.
b) The state
The switch from traditional to private sector debt is
but one indication of the new role of the state in the
Chilean model. This role has been defined as 'sub-
sidiarity', ie the state only undertakes those activities
which the private sector cannot do (in practice, because
of military ideology, exceptions are made on grounds
of 'national security'more often than the Chicago
Boys would like). This was summed up shortly after
the coup when Admiral Merino declared that 'there is
no worse businessman than the state'.
In line with this there has been a rapid process of
privatisation, so that out of the 464 firms under state
control on 11 September 1973, some 394 had been
sold by June 1977 (at a price of some $434.3mn, a very
undervalued sum), and the remainder, apart from
some very minor ones, sold by June 1980. Although an
initial attempt, pushed by the Christian Democrat
Chicago group, was made to try and disperse the sale
of state firms, so as to avoid the problem of concentration,
this was soon abandoned, and market criteria were
the sole criteria applied, and the sales accentuated the
trend towards concentration.
Within the state sector itself ODEPLAN, the State
Planning Office, gained a degree of control which
would be the envy of many a Planning Office elsewhere,
and not least of Alle nde's planners. Together with the
Minister of Economy and the Minister of Finance the
existing state sector was re-organised and ran without
a deficit. Of the nine wholly state owned firms (excluding
copper) in 1979 with a total expenditure of $2,622.8mn,
income was $2,643.3mn giving a surplus of $20.Smn.
And for the first time in many years the fiscal budget
had a surplus of 7.5 per cent of total expenditure in
1979, which was a great contrast to the 55.1 per cent
deficit in total expenditure in 1973. Paradoxically, the
state sector has never been so thoroughly planned as
under the Chicago Boys (ODEPLAN vets all expenditure
plans).
Within state expenditure there has been an increase in
expenditure on the armed forces and the police (in
equipment, armaments, number of men, and material
provisions, the armed forces are an 'island of welfare
socialism' completely sheltered from the market).
State/civil society relations have also been altered.
Pressure groups, including the formal ones of the
dominant classes, are not meant to act as pressure
groups on the state, or be consulted on policies affecting
them. State decisions are meant to be 'technical', free
from civil society pressures. Indeed the leadership of
the main pressure groups has become a pressure
group of the state rather than on the state. Their role
has been to persuade their constituent members of the
correctness of the government's line, and defuse potential
protests and action against the Chicago line. This so-
called 'neutral technification' of the state has been
extremely effective in disarming non-political party
opposition: protest is particularistic and therefore non
legitimate. At the same time, of course, it has aided
and abetted the spectacular process of concentration
in Chile.
c Monetary policy and inflation
j) Money
Money is considered crucial in the Chicago model.
The Chicago School places particular emphasis on
the importance of price, and the role of prices in
determining allocation (prices, of course, are meant to.
be determined by the 'natural' processes of competition).
Hence the importance of money as the unit in which
prices are expressed. If this unit is unstable then the
processes of competition become distorted. Inflation,
therefore, for the Chicago School is public enemy
number one. In addition, as Friedman has frequently
emphasized, inflation is a politicising process, one that
can lead to the breakdown of society and revolutionaty
outbreaks (there can be little doubt that the highly
politicised nature of Chilean society is partly related
to its long history of high inflation rates since the
1880s). The choice of this target also allows them to
attack two institutions they are opposed tothe state
and trade unions; as well as what they regard as the
Achilles Heel in Keynesian theory.
One of the first acts of the Junta after the coup was the
freeing of prices. For the economic team, price controls
signalled repressed inflation. In their view, logically
according to the Chicago model, if there is something
worse than open inflation, it is repressed inflation. In
1973 about 4,000 products were subject to price controls;
by 1978 this was down to eight. The freeing of prices,
combined with massive devaluations, meant a rapid
increase in the rate of inflation, thus preparing the
ground for the introduction of 'shock treatment'.
Mainly for political reasons the emphasis in Chile,
unlike in Britain, has been less on the money supply
per se and more on fiscal expenditure. There has
undoubtedly been a correlation between the decrease
in the rate of inflation and the decrease in the rate of
growth of the money supply. Such a correlation,
however, says nothing about causal connections nor
indeed about the social costs involved. The model
then has been successful at reducing the rate of
inflation from 508 per cent in 1973 to 31.2 per cent in
1980, but much more slowly than predicted, (this is
contrary to the Chicago experts' predictions).
Interestingly the shock period did not produce the
desired results as regards inflation. And within the
anti-inflationary policies the attempt to control money
supply proved difficult; the brunt of the anti-inflationary
policy was a drastic reduction of demand by reducing
wages and government expenditure. Fiscal spending
as a percentage of GDP expenditure thus fell drastically
during shock (at the end of 1975 it was 46 per cent less
than its 1973 per cent level), and the cut in fiscal
spending combined with the tax reforms of 1974 and
1975, which essentially replaced the sales tax with a
value-added tax, doubling government revenues as a
percentage of GDP over the period, reduced the fiscal
deficit from 23.5 per cent of GDP in 1973 to only 1.2
per cent in 1978. These shifts involved a substantial
change in the distributional role of the state. The
abolition of the capital gains tax and other reforms
benefited the capitalist class; and the shift in fiscal
expenditure from education, health, housing and
construction into defence and unemployment benefits
penalised the poor.
The growth of money supply shows an erratic pattern,
revealing the difficulties in trying to control the money
supply directly. And indeed the Chilean economic
team have never publicly set themselves money supply
targets. Nevertheless, until 1977 controls on domestic
and foreign credits were severe, with reserve require-
ments of up to 50 per cent, for example. But after 1977
when controls on foreign credits began to be dismantled,
monetary policy became a secondary instrument in
government control policies.
However, there has been a revolution on the monetary
side in Chile, with a completely new legislative position
for banks and financial institutions. The development
of a capital market was, from the beginning, one of the
key objectives of the Chicago Boys, and its development
shows how the economic team used the reforms they
pushed through to assist themselves and those of their
key backers. This, however, they would not regard as
the old-fashioned style of 'corruption' but rather the
blurring of the line between public and private interests,
a line Chicago philosophy does not recognise.0 Thus
when the banks remained 'nationalised', legislation
was passed freeing the rate of interest for finance
companies which helped the spectacular growth of
the Vial economic empire. When the banks were sold
no attempt was made to prevent the concentration of
1A Whos Who of the Chilean economic team and their subseQuent
positions after leaving the government shows a high concentration of
them in top positions in the Cruzat and Vial empires.
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the banks in few hands (contrary to the official
legislation). The rate of interest was freed and policies
undertaken to unify the capital markets by ending the
differential policies between the various financial and
banking sectors (in June 1975 government policies, in
effect, ensured the transfer of funds from the public
sector institution, SINAP, to the private sectors).
The freeing of interest rates led to a rapid increase in
the real rate of interest as can be seen from the
following table:
table 1
Short-term average real interest rates in Chile
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Source: A. Ferrer, 'El Monetarismo en Argentina y Chile',
Comercio Exterior, no 1, January 1981.
The spread between the lending and borrowing rate
meant those in charge of the financial markets could
make high profits. And, equally important, especially
after 1977, was the gap between foreign and domestic
interest rates, making it very profitable for those few
Chilean institutions with access to foreign credit.
The development of the financial market combined
with the rapid privatisation of the public sector has led
to an extreme process of concentration of capital in
Chile. The existence of powerful economic groups
dominating the economy is not something new in
Chile: but never before have so few groups dominated
so much. In the most comprehensive study of the
problem Dahse [19791 has shown that five economic
groups own 53 per cent of assets of the top 250 private
firms in Chile (including foreign), in effect controlling
the economy outside the state sector (which, as argued
here, is to a great extent run by protégés sympathetic
to the leading groups). The recent reforms of the
pension funds have further increased this process of
concentration, with the Cruzat and Vial groups capturing
73 per cent of the funds.
Each economic group is centred around control of a
bank and/or financial institution which acts as the
nerve-centre and headquarters of all the group's other
activities. Chile is seeing, in effect, the transition to
bank control of its economy: it is essentially the banks
which determine the allocation of resources.
Materials of production
The model as applied in Chile has a very simple view
of materials of production: national materials are
whatever is naturally abundant; land, sea and minerals;
the rest are to be imported. Transfer of technology is
thus not a problem: exports, in effect, are (to use
Marxist terminology) the Department Lof the economy,
supplying foreign exchange to import the means of
production. This is, of course, a return to the simplest
version of Ricardian comparative advantage, and has
important consequences for labour skills and political
democracy. Skilled labour is hardly needed, nor is an
elaborate educational system to train it. And there is,
of course, a contradiction between political democracy,
and all the pressures for change which accompany
democracy, and a low-wage economy with mass un-
employment.
Labour power
Lt took the Chicago team some six years to finally gain
control of the Ministry of Labour and push through a
new body of trade union legislation in keeping with
the overall philosophy of their model, the Plan Laboral
[see Haworth and Roddick 1981 j. The earlier period
of simple repression (which the Chicago team did not
regard as unnecessary) has now given way to 'free, non
political trade unions', although repression has certainly
not ended. The new legislation, which is a sophisticated
overturning of all the old labour legislation, is designed
to atomise and weaken the trade unions by subjecting
them to the so-called strict laws of the market, and, in
effect, to individualise and commoditise labour. The
Chicago Boys are fond of arguing that labour is a
commodity like any other commodity, subject to the
same universal, impersonal economic laws. Thus any
attempt at political, class solidarity or even inter-
factory supportive actions are prohibited. Strikes are
legal, but the legislation is designed to ensure that the
workers stand little chance of success. Collective
contracts do not exist in legal terms. Collective bargaining
is reduced to a summing of individual negotiations
between worker and employer.
The efficient operation of labour markets as defined
by Chicago does require unemployment. The actual
rate of unemployment is subject to much controversy,
but even the minimum figures show that it has ranged
from about 20 per cent in 1976 to 13 per cent in 1980
(16-17 per cent with PEM) ie contrary to Friedman's
claim that high unemployment would be a temporary
feature of the model, it looks as if the 'natural rate of
unemployment', to use a Friedman phrase, will
permanently be above 10 per cent. Few sections of the
work force can bargain for higher wages in such a
situation, as the collective agreements in 1980 show.
Unemployment also plays an important political role
in dividing and weakening the trade union movement
which still remains divided, weak and demoralised.
year lending rate borrowing rate
%
1975 15.9 11.9
1976 64.2 41.9
1977 57.2 41.3
1978 42.6 36.2
1979 22.0 20.9
Indeed, the architect of the Plan Laboral, José Piñera,
believes the Plan will depoliticise the Chilean labour
movement much more effectively than repression, or
a government-controlled union movement. This Plan,
together with a repressive competitive, individualised,
consumerist society see Filgueira's article in this
Bulletin J, is designed to ensure that collective action is
difficult.
Unemployment, of course, is not only a waste of
resources but a human tragedy. But even many of
those with work have seen a fall in their standard of
living. Again, what has happened to income distribution
is subject to fierce controversy, but the overall conclusion
must be that there has been a general worsening of
income distribution.
So, even apart from the very brutal repression and
suppression of democracy at all levels, Chile faces a
potential social time bomb, and it is this which is the
main contradiction of the Chicago model. Politically
the opposition has been inept at reorganising itself to
face the challenge of the Pinochet regime (though
there are understandable reasons for this), but the
feeling of frustration and bitterness goes very deep in
Chile. And the Chicago model is remarkably insensitive,
applied as it is with a dogmatic arrogance bordering
on the pathological.
iv) Conditions of work
The productive process has been characterised by a
return to rigid, hierarchical controls within the work-
place. Early flirtations with an Estatuto Social de
Empresa were soon abandoned, and instead workers
have no rights whatsoever over work processes or
conditions, which are by law excluded from collective
bargaining. Evidence is scanty, but it seems that health
and safety conditions have declined and payment of
social security benefits decreased. Given the nature of
the commodities the model is designed to produce,
there has been a process of deskilling of the labour
force (a fact reflected in the restructuring of education
and health), in which a low wage, unskilled work force
becomes a part of Chile's comparative advantage.
Such a process is and will be hard to reconcile with
political democracy, particularly when the work force
has been used to something different.
y) Structure of production
There has been an important change in the structure
of commodities produced away from industry, par-
ticularly those industries producing for the internal
market, towards agricultural, agriculturally based
(although they technically appear as manufacturing)
and mining exports. A whole range of products: textiles,
furniture, printing, leather, non electrical machinery,
were significantly below their 1968 level in 1978. All
these products are basically catering for the domestic
market. Other industrial products have increased their
production, such as paper, drinks, petroleum, basic
metals, etc, basically those (apart from petroleum)
destined for export.
The distribution of GDP by sectors reveals the shift
away from industry, as Table 2 indicates.
table 2
Chiledistribution of GDP by sectors 1973-77
(% in 1965 constant prices)
Until 1980, in spite of a semi-destroyed internal market,
there has been littlç problem of realisation: the markets
are there for Chilean products. Income elasticity of
demand for Chilean exports does seem to be greater
than one, and particularly if the price of copper
remains high (a big if), the terms of trade may be
favourable to Chile. It does not look as if the model
will collapse because international demand for Chilean
exports will collapse, although the new order does
mean that the Chilean economy is highly sensitive to,
and dependent on, the international economy, the
consequences of which have become clearer in 1981.
vi) Investment
However, a major contradiction in the Chilean model
is the low level of investment. There has been a
significant growth in GNP since 1977, and this has led
the Chicago Boys to predict a long run growth of 10
per cent per annum putting Chile firmly in the 'economic
miracle' class. This view has been supported by Professor
Harberger, who recently stated in Chile that in ten
years Chileans will enjoy a standard of living similar to
that of Spain, with a domestic product at the moment
about double Chile's, while in twenty years Chileans
will possibly be enjoying the same standard of living as
Holland'provided, of course, that there is a constant
application of the same policies.
The 'economic miracle' recedes somewhat if a closer
look is taken at the GNP figures. In fact, Chilean per
capita GNP has only risen from Sl,84l in 1971 to
$1,920 in 1979. that is, and increase of $79 over eight
years or $10 per year, which is hardly an economic
miracle!
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sectors 1973 1977
Agriculture
(including forestry
and fishing) 6.9 10.1
Mining 6.6 11.8
Manufacturing 26.1 20.6
Construction 3.6 2.6
Commerce 20.7 20.4
Other 36.0 34.4
total 100.0 100.0
The predicted 10 per cent per annum growth figure
seems even less likely if one looks at the rate of
investment. This has been well below the historical
rate for Chile, and is one of the lowest in Latin
America)2 So far the model has not led to a process of
accumulation (although ODEPLAN predicts that
investment will be 15 per cent of GNP in 1980 and are
estimating that it will rise to 22 per cent by 1985). 1980
saw a decline in the growth of GNP to 6.5 per cent
from 8.5 per cent in 1979, and the predicted growth
rate for 1981 is down to 3 per cent to 4 per cent.
Now it may be true that many of the products Chile is
exporting are low value added, technologically simple
and with a high output capital ratio, and that Chile can
grow fast with a low investment ratio. But for how
long? It could also be argued that the fast growth rates
after 1977 are a consequence of taking up some of the
massive excess capacity engineered by the 1975-76
shock, a position supported by the fall in growth rates
in 1980 and 1981. The model, in fact, faces a dilemma:
if the private sector does not reinvest within Chile and
if foreign private capital does not invest, then the
model faces a crisis of accumulation, unless the state
undertakes a massive programme of investments which
is precisely what the model is meant to avoid. Already
the utilisation of installed capacity in the manufacturing
sector is close to its limit (according to a SOFOFA
survey installed capacity utilisation increased from
75.5 per cent in August 1979 to 81.5 per cent in August
1980). So will the private sector invest and if not will
the state do it?
Until 1980 the Chicago Boys triumphantly proclaimed
that their policies had produced an 'economic miracle',
a miracle which they extrapolated into 10 per cent
growth rate for the next decade and more. But in 1981
the problematic aspects of their policies became
clearer.
Export earnings in 1981 are dropping fast. The price
of copper has fallen from the very high $1.48 per Ib in
February 1980 to 75 cents a lb in mid-1981. Chile's
fastest growing non-traditional export, forestry products,
which increased from 3.1 per cent of exports in 1973 to
12.1 per cent in 1980, are falling by about 20 per cent.
The fixed exchange rate is beginning to discourage
small exporters, especially those who have to borrow
locally. The increase in interest rates in the USA has
dramatically increased service charges on Chile's debt
and made the continuing flow of private bank loans
into Chile problematic. The increase in real wages in
1979 and 1980 increased the demand for imported
foodstuffs (the switch to exports in agriculture left the
agrarian sector producing for the domestic market
2Faced with this problem ODEPLAN simply revised its statistics in
1981. Thus whereas ODEPLAN had previously shown investment as
a percentage of GDP as 8.8 per cent in 1977 this has now become 13.3
per cent and the 10.3 per cent in 1978 has become 14.7 per cent and
the 15.0 per cent in 1980 has become 17.9 per cent.
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very depressed), whilst the demand for consumer
durables continues unabated. Thus with imports
increasing and exports declining, the deficit on the
commercial balance of payments could run to over
$3,000 mn; with high debt service, the current account
deficit will be much higher, reaching at least $9,000
mn. The authorities' response has been to allow interest
rates to shoot up, pushing the economy into a recession
with more bankruptcies, higher unemployment and
lower wages, less government social expenditure, and
further concentration. It also means an increase in
repression: the government's sole response to social
protest.
The key question remains, for how long are foreign
bankers willing to finance the Pinochet regime in
Chile? The answer to this depends not only on economic
but also on political factors.
Conclusion
Milton Friedman himserf has argued that there is 'an
intimate connection between economics and politics...
only certain combinations of political and economic
arrangements are possible' IFriedman 19621. I have
argued that there is nothing accidental about the
combination of a repressive dictatorship and the Chicago
economic model: indeed, the economic model could
hardly be implemented without a dictatorship. Moreover,
the Chicago Boys organised themselves politically to
assist the process towards an extreme centralisation of
power in Chile. This centralisation of political power
has been accompanied by a concentration of economic
power; in practice Chile is perhaps little more than a
spectacular example of private greed masquerading
as a model of economic development. In developed
capitalist economies the Chicago model is likely to fail
as people begin to fight back against its consequences.
Unfortunately, in underdeveloped capitalist countries,
where democratic procedures and institutions are
virtually non-existent, or extremely fragile, resistance
is met by repression. In these countries the Chicago
model will necessarily be accompanied by dictatorship,
repression and misery for the mass of the population.
Such is the New Leviathan.
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